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Humbling Turkishness: Undoing the Strategies of Exclusion and Inclusion of 
Turkish Modernity 
 
Dr Ipek Demir1 
 
 
Abstract Kurds make up about a fifth of Turkey's population. Turkey has taken 
steps – albeit slowly and reluctantly – towards increased recognition of Kurdish 
cultural and linguistic rights. However, within Turkey there is also a steeply rising 
tide of Turkish nationalism, prejudice and intolerance towards Kurds, and 
increasing anti-Kurdish sentiment. This article brings studies of Kurdishness and 
Turkishness into a single conversation and traces the relationship between 
Turkish modernity, Orientalized Kurdishness and the construction of Turkishness 
as the efendi (master) identity. It does this by drawing attention to ‘strategies of 
exclusion and inclusion’ in the construction of official Turkish history, and relates 
these to the way in which the tense borders between Kurds and Turks are 
maintained and currently reproduced. It also presents a normative argument in 
favour of ‘humbling Turkishness’ and ‘solidarity trading zones’. 
 
Key words: humbling, Kurdishness, Orientalism, solidarity, translation, 
Turkishness 
***** 
 
‘On the way to school’ (İki Dil Bir Bavul) is a documentary film from Turkey. Its 
main concerns are communication and interaction, including the questioning of 
the taken for granted configurations, between Kurdishness and Turkishness in 
Turkey. In the film, a Turkish teacher, ‘Teacher Emre’ (Emre Öğretmen) is 
appointed to teach primary school children in a remote Kurdish village in Turkey. 
When Emre Öğretmen arrives in the village, he is surprised to find that his 
students do not understand him at all as they only speak their native tongue, 
Kurdish. Emre Öğretmen is then not only faced with the task of teaching them to 
read and write within the jingoistic Turkish school curriculum, but also 
simultaneously teaching them the Turkish language. In addition, he has to 
grapple with his adaptation to an alien place, to an unfamiliar environment, 
different to his ‘homeland’. He experiences being a ‘stranger’ in his own country. 
We learn about his estrangement and feelings of exile through his telephone 
conversations with his mother. As the year proceeds, he and the Kurdish 
students and villagers establish a warm, but nevertheless uneasy, relationship. 
They slowly start to learn and understand each other despite continuing to make 
mistakes, misunderstand, and at times face total communication failures. The 
key relevant message of the film is delivered when one of the parents says to 
Emre Öğretmen something akin to ‘You came here to teach; but it is you who 
also needs to learn’. The ‘learning’ here need not be seen purely in terms of 
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learning the Kurdish language. It refers to the Kurdish culture, identity and 
history, and most importantly learning the Kurds’ way of seeing Turkishness. It 
calls for prescribed roles to be swapped where the ‘teacher’ becomes the 
‘learner’. The Turkish teacher, the ‘harbinger of civilization’ is invited to 
transform himself into a student. The ‘other’ can then also transform, from being 
merely approached as an ‘object’ or ‘recipient’ of policies, of intervention and of 
discipline to being a reciprocal interlocutor.  
 
What prompted me to preface my article by mentioning this film is that it 
is in fact an allegory not only for the thorny relationship and frictions between 
Kurdishness and Turkishness1 in Turkey, but also for the normative stance I will 
defend in this article. It points towards how the identity that holds the upper 
hand (Turkishness), has to cease to see itself as the ‘efendi’ (master), and bring a 
halt to the Orientalist construction which drives it to attempt to teach and civilize 
the ‘other’, the Kurds. It highlights that in order to establish some sort of 
meaningful interaction between the two main groups in Turkey, the dominant 
group, namely the Turks, have to engage in the demanding job of learning and 
discovery and engage Kurds as equal interlocutors. This learning is gruelling; not 
because what needs to be learnt is complex, but because such learning is 
uncomfortable, distressing and painful. Secondly, it entails learning the other’s 
way of seeing you. Thirdly, it gives recognition to the fact that learning also 
includes ‘unlearning’ (Asad and Dixon 1985). It requires one to disrupt and 
question what one has learnt about oneself, one’s own history and culture, as 
well as what one ‘knows’ about the other. It requires epistemological humbling 
(Vázquez 2011). 
 
In order to explore such themes, the paper will employ an epistemology 
of interaction, namely the ‘Second Language Learning Thesis’ (SLLT), to discuss a 
way in which the relationship between Kurds and Turks can be understood, 
represented and also how a dialogue can potentially be developed. I will do this 
by drawing attention to what I refer to as the ‘strategies of exclusion’ and 
‘strategies of inclusion’ of Turkish modernity, and then by relating these to the 
current reproduction of the tense borders between the two groups and 
interlinked identities. I will discuss the ways in which spatial and temporal 
borders intersect with ethno-political ones and help shape the concretization of 
interactions in a particular way. By paying attention to both ‘strategies of 
exclusion’ and ‘strategies of inclusion’, I also aim to contribute to an 
understanding of the role of Turkish modernity vis-à-vis the Kurdish demands 
and predicament, and emphasize Turkish modernity’s continuing role in the 
construction of notions of superiority and inferiority between the Turks and 
Kurds. In other words, I aim to point to the similarities and continuities between 
the policing of how Turkish history and modernity are constructed and told, and 
the way in which Kurdishness is currently perceived in Turkey. By way of these 
investigations, the paper will explore and elucidate how certain processes 
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hinder, and how some others ease, the establishment of a meaningful 
interaction and relationship between the two identities.  
 
1. Epistemology of Interaction: The Second Language Learning Thesis (SLLT) 
 
The second Language Learning Thesis (SLLT) is an epistemological tool which has 
been developed to theorize and explain contact, exchange and relations across 
the borders of frameworks, be they cultures, ideologies, ethnic groups, 
disciplines, or moral traditions. It is an ‘epistemology of interaction’ (Demir 
2011). SLLT is not about ‘language’ per se. It is broad, and includes cultural, 
historical and political learning. It refers to the process of extending one’s 
understanding, awareness, perception and knowledge in the process of 
engagement with another, whether that other is a historical framework or a 
contemporary one. It is an invitation to extend one’s own categories, language, 
awareness and familiarity to understand the other rather than merely thrusting 
the other into one’s own framework, forcing its representation within ‘our’ 
worldview. It is geared towards challenging the mere translation and rendering 
of the other into our own framework. Translation is associated with 
appropriation and hence, as Venuti (2008) argues, can be highly ethnocentric, 
requiring the other to be made intelligible in the language and value system of 
the dominant. Instead, SLLT seeks to prioritize permeation into, and 
familiarization with, the other, including humbling one’s dominant self, identity 
and culture and learning to engage in the painful and awkward process of seeing 
oneself through the eyes of the other. In other words, it requires not only 
learning the other, but also through unfamiliarizing our identity and history, it 
necessitates us look at and re-learn ourselves in a new context.   
 
This epistemology of interaction does not ignore the difficulties 
associated with breaking established boundaries (Benjamin 1996). It invites the 
exploration of the processes though which those from different frameworks can 
engage and interact with one another whilst simultaneously paying attention to 
the troubles and difficulties of communication, commensuration, comparison 
and evaluation across different frameworks (Demir 2011). It attempts to capture 
the keenness of actors (or lack thereof) to go beyond established spatial and 
temporal borders. This is why it attempts to draw attention to the political and 
ethnographic character of learning across borders. As an epistemology of 
interaction then, the SLLT acknowledges that communication, interaction, 
comparison and immersion are riddled with problems and burdens and are 
almost always jerky and arduous, caught up in asymmetric relations and 
exchanges. As it starts from the fact that the newly learnt framework, culture or 
value system is only a second language, it remains mindful of the fact that 
unfamiliarity (in the form of relative foreignness and awkwardness) is a condition 
of interaction across borders. 
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The SLLT has three specific pillars. First, it draws attention to the socially 
constituted nature of borders and interactions between groups, cultures, and 
ideologies. Secondly, it aims to expose the asymmetric nature of interactions, 
including social, economic and linguistic hegemony. Thirdly, it attempts to 
incorporate the different types and layers of second language learning, including 
what I call ‘solidarity trading zones’. In Section 2 below, the article will engage 
with the first two of these themes in relation to Kurdishness and Turkishness. It 
will discuss the historical construction of Turkishness and the simultaneous 
negation of Kurdishness and relate these to the current social construction of 
borders and interactions. It will bring together the literature on Kurdishness and 
Turkishness into a single conversation, and in so doing will highlight the need for 
the questioning of the Orientalist depiction of the Kurds in Turkey, and the 
related hegemonic efendi positioning of Turkishness, and call for the much-
needed ‘humbling’ of the latter. Section 3 will discuss how ‘solidarity trading 
zones’ which consciously go beyond identity politics might allow interaction and 
diffusion between identities, including the re-drawing of boundaries between 
them. 
 
2. The hegemonic efendi Identity: socially constituted character of borders 
between Kurdishness and Turkishness 
 
The Turkish nation-building project was founded upon the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the associated trauma and feelings of vengeance and humiliation 
suffered in the process of its slow and painful collapse during the late 19th 
century and early 20th century. As several historians, sociologists and theorists of 
modernity, westernization and nationalism have argued, the Kemalist Turkish 
nation-building project and its associated aspirations for modernity and 
westernization aimed to construct a centralized, secular, and homogenized 
nation-state (e.g. Aktar 2010; Houston 2009; Yeğen 2009; Özkırımlı and Spyros 
2008; Zeydanlıoğlu 2008; Bozarslan 2007; White 2007, Yeğen 2007a, 2007b; 
Cagaptay 2006; Yeğen 2004; Ahıska 2003; Derinligil 2003; Kahraman 2002; Yeğen 
1999; Bora 1998; Soğuk 1993). Multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity were seen as 
major threats to this modernization. Consequently, the religious, ethnic, cultural 
differences and identities which challenged this desired homogeneity were 
denied, erased or, at times, brutally silenced. In the eyes of the nationalist elite 
who mainly came from the military or bureaucratic cadres, modernity required a 
homogenous and centralized nation-state which would ensure not only 
cohesiveness, purity, strength and hence national success, but also would steer 
Turkey towards becoming like the ‘civilized’ and modern European states. In 
opposition to the religious, ethnic and cultural diversity of the Ottoman Empire, 
and in tandem with what they saw as the modernist Enlightenment ideals and 
successful nation states of Europe, the ruling nation-building elite aspired to 
form a homogenous, centralized, unified state and thus, in their eyes, a modern 
Turkish Republic.  
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The nation-building project had its origins in the Ottoman Turkist 
movement of late eighteen hundreds which itself was influenced by European 
Romantic nationalist thought. It was a top-down, elite-led, radical 
transformation. The desire to ‘reach the European level of modernity’ and to be 
‘civilized’ was thought to require the negation of the (Ottoman) past which, to its 
detriment, had relied on multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity. Accordingly, 
nation-building also required ‘some sections’ of the society to shake off their 
primitiveness, feudality, tribalism, banditry and hence backwardness. In contrast 
to these, westernization, modernity and civility were perceived to require a 
homogenous Turkish nation-state. The sizable Kurdish population, along with 
those who had a strong Muslim identity, were seen as the two biggest 
impediments to the success of this secularist and modernist Turkish nation-
building project (Bozarslan 2007; White 2007; Smith 2005; Yavuz 1996). 
Consequently, since its inception in the 1920s, the Turkish Republic and the elites 
have been heavily engaged in the consolidation and at times coercive persuasion 
of these two groups: the Kurds were ‘persuaded’ towards Turkishness, the 
Muslims were ‘persuaded’ towards a narrow and strict version of secularism 
which ironically meant following closely the state’s definition (and regulation) of 
Sunni Islam. In what follows, I will focus on the first of those groups, namely the 
Kurds.  
 
As Yeğen has argued, the Turkish nation-building project required the 
‘transformation of a non-western, de-central, a-national and non-secular social 
formation (the Ottoman Empire) into a western, central, national and secular 
one (the Turkish Republic)’ (1999, p. 559) and ‘Kurdish identity was one of the 
victims of [this] political project’ (Ibid, p. 567). During this transformation, for 
example, the state discourse understood and presented the Kurdish rebellions of 
the 1920s and 1930s as reactionary, backward, religiously-oriented, and 
irrational, the work of bandits who longed for the old order, an order which the 
new republic was working hard to eradicate (Zeydanlıoğlu 2008; Bozarslan 2007; 
Watts 2007; Yavuz 2001). This version of Turkish history refused to consider and 
recognize the ethno-political dimension of the Kurdish revolts officially and 
publicly.2 The rebellions were officially described as being an outcome of an 
‘eastern’ (doğulu) or ‘backward’ (gerici) mindset. The Kurdish provinces were put 
under special measures and administration, governed as “internal colonies” 
(Bozarslan 2007, p. 44), at times under martial law. 
  
The Turkish state continued with the consolidation of state power over 
Kurds through increased state control and restrictions, centralization, as well as 
through population engineering and the shaping of the demographic 
configuration by uprooting and dispersing Kurdish groups amongst Turks, and 
settling Turkish peasants and non-Turkish Muslim refugees from elsewhere 
among the Kurds.3 These were carried out via the Settlement Laws of 1926 and 
1934, continuing with the Ottoman resettlement programmes. For the Turkish 
modernization, population engineering and related interventions were 
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presented as necessary acts of ‘civilizing’, put in place to eradicate disloyal 
groups and backward tribal attitudes, and to ensure that the separatist threats 
could be dealt with (Aktar 2010; Cagaptay 2006; Dündar 2001). Such measures 
not only found justification through official state ideology and actions, but also 
via the work of one of the leading sociologists of Turkish modernity and 
Turkishness, Ziya Gökalp, in the early republican period. 
 
Not only were the Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s perceived as 
evidence of longing for the past order, and were therefore suppressed, but also 
‘the lack of economic integration of the [Kurdish] region into the Turkish market’ 
in the 1950s and 1960 were construed as evidence of backwardness (Yeğen 
1999, p. 565) and ‘strictly in terms of regional inequalities’ (Bishku 2010, p. 83), 
again excluding the ethno-political dimension of the problem. In the 1980s and 
1990s however, the dominant construction came to be the presentation of the 
Kurdish problem in Turkey predominantly as a case of terrorism. This 
construction was made possible by the Turkish military coup of 1980, and the 
start of the guerrilla campaign of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1984, the 
latter demanding a separate homeland for Kurds (Gunes 2012). Kurdish 
provinces were governed under special measures, namely the Regional State of 
Emergency Government (referred to as OHAL in Turkish) between 1987 and 
2002.4 The violence reinforced the ‘fetishism of the military solution’ to the 
Kurdish problem in the 1980s and 1990s and the attribution of untrustworthiness 
and treacherousness to the Kurds. Since 2000, the perception has continued with 
new adjunct perceptions of Kurds as disloyal others in the form of ‘psuedo-
citizens’ (Yeğen 2009; 2007a) and the significant increase in anti-Kurdish 
sentiment, otherization and stigmatization of Kurds (Saraçoğlu 2010), including in 
the legal system (Bayir 2013) and the media (Demir and Zeydanlıoğlu 2010). 
These characterizations go hand-in-hand with the perennial characterization of 
the Kurdish problem in Turkey as one of pre-modernity, backwardness, banditry 
and the refusal to assimilate into modernity.  
 
In order to reveal the socially-constituted borders of Kurdishness and 
Turkishness then, one needs to recognize first that the exclusion of Kurdishness 
was made possible through the inclusion of a particular Orientalist narrative 
created around the easternness of Kurds, through the attribution of inherent 
characteristics to those from the east, and the ‘conversion’ and (mis)translation 
of their ethno-political demands into claims about backwardness and anti-
modernity. Even though Orientalist narratives were also employed during the 
Ottoman period, especially when the Ottoman elites resorted to Orientalist 
tropes in their dealings with, and representations of, their ethnic and tribal 
periphery (Makdisi 2002), the exclusion of Kurdishness and the simultaneous 
inclusion of a particular Orientalist narrative (on Kurds) was more intense and 
influential during the early decades of the Turkish Republic as such narratives 
coincided with Turkish nation-building and were posited against a hegemonic 
Turkishness. It is to this Turkishness that I now turn my attention. 
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My second point is that the modern, secular, centralized, and 
westernized Turkishness was constructed in opposition to this particular 
easternness. That is, whilst Kurds could not shake off their backwardness and 
easterness, Turkishness emerged as dominant, dignified and noble, clasping on 
to what I refer to as the efendi (master) identity. In other words, modernity in 
Turkey not only included strategies of inclusion of the discourse of ‘easterness’ 
(of Kurds) but also strategies of inclusion of a ‘western’ Turkish identity that was 
deemed superior. This dual inclusion is central to the construction of the 
superiority and centrality of Turkishness to date. Such claims of Turkishness, 
especially in the early Republican period, were accompanied by racial overtones 
and ‘race science’, for example via the use of anthropometrics and biometrics to 
confirm the inherent characteristics of Turks as civilizers and modernizers, as 
well as referring to Turks’ ‘innate’ beauty, intelligence, talent and strength and 
their westernness and whiteness (Engin 2008a; 2008b).  
 
In the Kemalist political language, “Turkishness” meant a “positive 
atavism” containing, in its very essence, civilization, revolution, beauty, 
and the spirit of independence, as opposed to the Kurdish “negative 
atavism” which was synonymous with feudalism, ugliness, reaction, 
Barbary, and the spirit of slavery (Bozarslan 2007, p. 46). 
 
Racial overtones, the discourse of eugenics, archaeology, anthropology as 
well as the Sun Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teorisi) and the Turkish History 
Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) placed Turks at the root of all world civilizations and 
languages by revealing their ‘innate’ character. The Turkish History Thesis served 
a multitude of purposes. For example, it aimed to prove (and celebrate) that the 
glorious and ancient civilization-founding peoples of Anatolia (e.g. the Hittites 
and Sumerians) were Turks and therefore the Turkish race was key to the 
creation and dispersal of human civilization (Aydin 2010; Göksu Özdoğan 2010). 
It also attempted to establish that the ‘Turks came from a European/“Alpine” 
race, and not from an inferior Asian one’ (Aydin 2010, p. 38), as such providing 
an innately western identity and past for Turkishness to settle into comfortably. 
As such, it told the past in a way which fitted the priorities of the nationalist 
governing elites.  
 
This construction of Turkishness as the dominant, sublime ethnic and 
national identity went hand in hand with the modernization of the Turkish 
language. Whilst other languages were suppressed, denigrated or banned, for 
example via the campaigns entitled ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ (Vatandaş Türkçe 
Konuş!)5, the Turkish language was ‘occidentalized, “modernized” and purified 
from external influences’ (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, p. 117). Official cultural, linguistic 
and historical narratives were created and propagated through state institutions 
such as the Ataturk Culture, Language and History High Institute (Atatürk Kültür 
Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu), the Turkish Culture and Research Institute (Türk 
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Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü), the Turkish Language Institute (Türk Dil Kurumu), 
and the Turkish History Institute (Türk Tarih Kurumu).  
 
Through such interjections, Turkishness was eternalized, crowned with a 
proud past and a hopeful future, ready to govern, civilize and modernize its 
others. That is to say, it was positioned as efendi. This occurred despite its being 
perceived as the enfant terrible of Europe: 
 
As long as Turkishness contained the essential element that made the 
West modern, Turkey could create a distinctive tradition within 
modernity. Being the West’s Other, or the ‘terrible Turk’, posed no 
problem as long as the republican elite could convince themselves, and 
everyone else, that Turks were innately western (Engin 2008a, p. 297). 
 
Thirdly, these historical constructions of Turkishness and easternness, go hand in 
hand with the reluctant reception of Kurdishness and the ‘Kurdish initiative’ in 
Turkey today.6 The intolerance and loathing shown towards the granting of 
Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights (Sezgin and Wall 2005), the continuing 
prohibition on the public use of Kurdish,7 the demonization and stigmatization of 
Kurdish leaders (Demir and Zeydanlıoğlu 2010), the steeply rising anti-Kurdish 
sentiment in Turkey (Saraçoğlu 2010; Karabat 2008) vis-à-vis the steeply rising 
‘ethno-nationalist and xenophobic [Turkish] self-image’ (Çırakman 2011) as well 
as the dominant explanation of the relative deprivation of the Kurdish areas by 
referring to Kurds’ backwardness without addressing structural inequalities and 
the dynamics of wealth creation and distribution in Turkey, are some of the 
many remaining legacies of the inclusion of a particular Orientalist and 
stigmatized narrative (easternness) together with the reinforced  acceptance of a 
dominant and superior, efendi Turkishness.  
 
This legacy of nation building in Turkey, and its strategies of inclusion and 
exclusion are still currently operative. Even the recent (though limited) 
recognition and expansion of Kurdish rights in Turkey by the governing party, the 
AKP, is based on a hierarchical efendi relationship in which the dominant identity 
(Turkishness) allows Kurds some rights —albeit reluctantly— rather than seeing 
them as citizens deserving cultural and linguistic rights equal (or at least 
comparable) to those that Turks already possess. The current ‘Kurdish’ reforms 
do not attempt to flatten hierarchies nor involve Kurds as interlocutors either. As 
Somer argues with regard to the reforms: ‘Turkish-majority actors do not 
recognize explicitly Kurdish political actors as parties they should ‘listen to’ even 
if these are legitimately elected’ (2008, p. 229). To this day, it remains an offence 
to insult ‘Turkishness’ as per the article 301 of the Turkish penal code. No other 
ethno-political identity is given similar protection in Turkey. Hence, whilst I 
appreciate that there has been some progress with regard to Kurdish rights, the 
hierarchic ordering of ethnicities and the efendi positioning of Turkishness still 
remain firmly intact.8  
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Through bringing studies of Kurdishness and Turkishness into a single 
conversation, the article has thus exposed certain strategies of involvement and 
exclusion within Turkish modernity.9 It also drew attention to the similar, though 
not identical, processes which arise when one begins to challenge the policing of 
how modern Turkish history is narrated, and when one questions the way in 
which existing boundaries between Kurdishness and Turkishness are currently 
drawn and policed. In other words, I highlighted interconnections between the 
construction and reinforcement of identities though both temporal and spatial 
policing, and in so doing attempted to open a simultaneous engagement with the 
past and present. Thinking through these temporal and spatial processes, I 
argue, requires second-language learning both of history and about those whom 
we continue to other. The first kind of learning I outlined summons the dominant 
efendi identity to learn the various historical strategies of exclusion and inclusion 
of Turkish modernity, including both ‘ignorant ignorance’ and ‘learned ignorance’ 
(Santos 2009, p. 114). The second type of learning invites the making of 
connections between the way in which modern Turkish history was narrated, 
and the way in which Turkishness is currently throned as efendi in Turkey. They 
therefore require the breaking of Turkish modernity’s (and Turkishness’s) 
certainty with itself. Through these interlinked processes, what I call ‘humbling 
Turkishness’ can begin. 
 
Humbling Turkishness requires a rigorous study of the ‘erasures’, that is 
the unpalatable aspects of history which have been left out or the horrors which 
have been ‘trivialized’ via discursive strategies. In relation to the latter, though 
focusing on another part of world history (the Haitian revolution), Trouillot talks 
about how certain discourses such as ‘ “It” did not really happen; it was not that 
bad, or that important’ (1995, p. 96) serve the important purpose of erasure. He 
refers to them as narratives which ‘sweeten the horror or banalize’ via 
utterances such as ‘some [Afro-American slaves] were better fed than British 
workers’ (1995, p. 97). In the Turkish case, past injustices are sweetened or 
banalized by attempting to cancel their relevance through pointing to injustices 
others (e.g. the West, the Kurds) have committed; or via utterances such as 
‘Turkish peasants are also poor’, ‘it is not a Kurdish or Turkish thing but a matter 
of economic underdevelopment’ or ‘we do not have a Kurdish problem in Turkey 
– this is just a Western plot to divide and weaken Turkey’. Besides questioning 
such banalizations of the problem and associated injustices, SLLT expects a 
rigorous study of what the ‘silenced’ say, that is, closely listening to the voices 
and stories of those who have been hushed. As such it would allow alternative 
knowledges and histories to emerge, to be heard and consequently to challenge 
the dominant narratives. It also requires not glossing over the positive 
contributions the othered (Kurds, in this case) has made to Turkey (e.g. during 
Turkey’s ‘War of Independence’ in the 1920s, culturally via music and literature, 
and economically as a source of immigrant ‘cheap’ labour, subsidizing the 
increasingly affluent lifestyles in ‘western’ Turkey). The aim is not to create an 
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alternative story of Turkish modernity, or some sort of a parallel universe. It is 
rather to unsettle Turkish modernity’s self-image and to enable the rethinking, 
reconstruction and retelling of the story of modernity in Turkey which is 
confident enough to carry the perspectives of those whom it erased or 
attempted to silence.  
 
3. Building and Fostering ‘Solidarity Trading Zones’:  
 
The epistemology of interaction that I have so far employed brings back the 
perennial challenge of ‘identity politics’ whereby occupying a particular position 
(e.g. being Kurdish, working class, lesbian) is thought to be necessary (though not 
sufficient) for questioning dominant ideologies and/or past injustices. With 
respect to this article, the question is then one of assuming a distinctly Kurdish 
voice and identity and using that singular identity as the main site of resistance 
and engagement with others. Following the criticisms that Bhambra and Margree 
(2010) have raised against identity politics, and those who challenge the false 
dichotomy of the homogenous universalism and fragmenting essentialism (for 
example, Matin 2012, Shilliam 2009). I argue that the redrawing of the 
boundaries of Kurdishness and Turkishness necessitates the building of what I 
call ‘solidarity trading zones’ rather than the building and pursuit of reified and 
reinforced (ethnic) identity-based politics. 
 
Solidarity trading zones can be thought of as sites where coordination 
and cooperation of activities around common political concerns and 
commitments are built and fostered between communities, and where ‘pidgins’ 
for communication and understanding are created and cultivated. What is aimed 
at is not a fully shared understanding or a common language across the 
membership of each community. Neither is there a requirement for the 
members to be stamped with an exact political-view-stamp, nor with a particular 
social position or identity. What is sought are the convergent processes of 
mutual engagement, the collaboration of activities around certain concerns and 
solidarities without assuming a central identity, position or neutral language. In 
other words, it highlights the possibility and attractiveness of putting our 
resources towards creating solidarity zones where none of us might speak the 
same language, occupy the same identity or have the exact same political 
approach or solutions, but we can nevertheless craft a coordination language, 
construct several practices and activities around specific concerns, injustices and 
stances (Demir 2011) ‘as opposed to these activities having to rely on assumed 
pre-existing identities (that is, being female, gay, black, dalit, etc.)’ (Bhambra and 
Margree 2010, p. 61). This is because we recognize the danger of cherishing and 
developing solidarities via the cultivation of incommensurable and reified 
identities, stances, frameworks and languages which inevitably posit groups 
against one another. 
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The limited ‘pidgins’ or practices that are developed in the solidarity 
trading zone can bridge and bond, allowing further solidarities to be established, 
for local coordination to be hammered out, or for existing collaborations to 
flourish. Despite their major differences, people, groups or clusters can build 
movements and mobilizations around particular issues and injustices. This means 
that neither a strongly shared social position, nor a strongly shared belief system 
is necessary. There is no requirement for having been a victim, or at the receiving 
end, of the injustice. Rather the requirement is one that is built around common 
activities which ‘facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those 
experiences the possible object of analysis and action for all’ (Bhambra and 
Margree 2010, p. 62). An example of a solidarity trading zones is the co-
authorship by several NGOs in Turkey and Physicians for Human Rights of a 
medical handbook entitled the ‘Istanbul Protocol’ to help doctors in Turkey and 
elsewhere document torture. Another is built around opposing the major dam 
project which will flood Hasankeyf, a town in the Kurdish region of Turkey. 
Others can be built around identifying and exposing jingoistic phrases in 
textbooks in Turkey.  
 
Moreover, it is in such trading zones that ideas, activities, concerns and 
issues can be traded and thus diffuse from one group to the other. Stories can 
flow from one to the other, across ethnic identities and allegiances. By taking 
part in them, actors can take back stories, experiences and concerns to the other 
groups, social situations and zones of which they are a part. Activities, concerns 
and solidarities of such zones can at times spill over and lead to the joining up of 
various inter-related solidarity zones. Or, what one experiences or learns in one 
solidarity zone can rupture, and extend beyond that zone, bring about change 
and lead to the questioning of hegemonic relationships in other spheres of life. 
Perhaps the best and most recent example of a solidarity trading zone was the 
recent Gezi Park protests in Turkey. The uprising, sparked by a desire to protect a 
public park in Istanbul, brought Kemalists, Alevis, pro-Kurdish party supporters, 
LGBT groups, the left and many other social and political groups and individuals 
together in their battle against authoritarian, paternalistic, conservative and neo-
liberal forces in Turkey. It allowed them to develop common activities, interact, 
coordinate, cooperate and work together. Other neighbourhoods, and cities 
joined the uprising, including Kurdish cities and citizens. It allowed new 
allegiances to be formed between disparate groups. In addition, it enabled 
learning (and humility) across the borders of different movements. For example, 
outraged by the violence the police inflicted, and the self-censorship popular 
Turkish media displayed in their reporting of the events, many Turks apologized 
to Kurds on twitter, not only sympathizing with what Kurds had to go through in 
the past, but also recognizing that they were misinformed by media and those in 
power about the Kurdish issue, and hence had failed to show enough humility 
and understanding towards Kurdish suffering. 12 
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Here then, there is no necessity for an Archimedean point or identity 
from which to engage in activities (as per Habermas’ idea of the public sphere). 
Nor is there a requirement for a full and fluent translation of injustices across 
reified ethno-identity politics. First, such translations are politically problematic 
as they will lead to getting to know the other via mediators. This in return can 
lead to one identity (e.g. Kurdishness) being spoken for, silencing certain 
discourses, histories or experiences, and possibly imposing unwanted and 
unwarranted meanings. It can lead to ventriloquism. Alternatively, a translation-
focused interaction can end up putting the onus on Kurds to translate 
themselves, forcing them to wrap and present themselves in the language of the 
dominant identity. The solidarity trading zones which I argue for have the 
potential to overcome both of these failings. Instead of attempting to translate 
the other, we explore the possibility of learning, interacting, cooperating and 
trading at borders without necessarily having to transfer one’s self into the 
language and value system of the dominant. As Asad argues (1986, p. 160) we 
need to ‘introduce and enlarge cultural capacities, learnt from other ways of 
living, into our own’ without centralizing ourselves. It is only then that we can 
engage in ‘critical ground clearing’ and ‘dislodge cannons to make space for 
alternatives’ (Clifford 1986, p. 24). 
 
4. Contingencies of Solidarity Trading Zones:  
 
This is not to deny the contingent character of solidarity trading zones. There is a 
need to explore the socio-political contexts which allow them to be built and 
fostered whilst paying attention to the arduous task of communicating, 
evaluating and commensurating across established borders and identities. In the 
rest of this article, I will discuss two central contingencies on which the creation 
and maintenance of solidarity trading zones between Kurdishness and 
Turkishness depend. 
 
The success of a solidarity-trading zone is contingent upon actors willingly 
making themselves vulnerable and humble. Breaking into another framework, 
learning its language, stories, pains, traumas and priorities, and consequently 
developing common activities and ‘pidgins’ mean that we leave behind the often 
de facto position of being on guard, in defence, impervious and self-righteous. It 
demands the lowering of shields and fortification mechanisms and the exposure 
of our vulnerabilities to the ‘other’ and possibly even opening ourselves up to 
criticism. Consequently it cannot be a sphere devoid of distress and discomfort. 
In Turkey there is an additional discomfort and distress which is referred to as 
the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’. This notion refers to the way in which there is a 
hightened fear that Western powers, along with Turkey’s ‘internal enemies’ are 
conspiring against Turkey in order to weaken and dismember its territorial and 
national integrity.10 Internal enemies of Turkey are construed as those citizens 
who are critical of Turkish policies, including the ethnic and religious minorities 
of Turkey who are asking for increased rights. They are posited as the pawns of 
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Western powers. Demands for increased minority rights and ethno-political 
activities in Turkey (unless of course they are praising Turkishness) are 
approached with suspicion. The national reflex is to see them as plotters. It is no 
wonder that attempts to grant more cultural and political rights to Kurds, 
Turkey’s biggest ethnic minority comprising about a fifth of the population, are 
seen as part of a plot to divide Turkey.  Even moderate voices, modest reforms 
and limited cultural and linguistic rights make many circles ‘uncomfortable’ 
(Romano 2010, p. 51). There is ‘irreversible recognition of the fact that Kurds 
cannot be forced into becoming Turks’ (O’Leary 2010, p. xi) yet, the modernist 
legacy, allied with the Sèvres Syndrome, does not allow much room for the 
epistemic reflexivity and humility needed from ‘Turkishness’. Whilst it might be 
argued that certain types of Kurdish nationalism also prevents the emergence of 
modest and credible alternatives, as Watts argues, the politics of polarization is 
primarily promoted by the Turkish state institutions and representatives via 
‘extensive use of coercion’ and a ‘rhetoric that marginalizes and demonizes pro-
Kurdish party leaders’ (2010, p. 108).  
 
Much faith has been put in the democratization and moderation process 
that Turkey’s membership application to the EU could bring. Whilst it is true that 
Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU) has helped further 
democratization, and has ‘greatly contributed to a reform process that has led to 
some public recognition of the Kurdish identity’ (Kirişçi 2010, p. 76), it is worth 
considering that the continuing refusal and humiliation of Turkey by the EU is 
now beginning to make the necessary humbling of Turkishness all the more 
difficult. The secular and military elites, the traditionally core defenders of the EU 
and westernization in Turkey, have begun to take up anti-EU and ‘reactionary 
anti-western’ positions (Gunter 2010, p. 199; Herzog 2009, p. 34). There is reason 
to think that the politics of deferral by the EU is now playing into the hands of 
the Sèvres Syndrome, making reified ethnic identities more likely, and solidarity 
trading zones less viable (see also Çırakman 2011). 
 
Secondly, solidarity trading zones are not simply for filling gaps in 
knowledge and correcting error, but for identifying and remedying bias and 
omission, especially employing a ‘critical evaluation of one’s memory’ (Misztal 
2011, p. 48) and where possible ‘putting the past in the service of the present’ 
(Misztal 2010, p. 35). The success of a zone then needs to be seen as contingent 
upon successfully developing not just a ‘pluralist attitude towards memory’ 
(Brewer 2010, p. 193), but one which would allow previously silenced memories 
to be verbalized, and others, especially dominant ones, to be challenged. 
 
What is important is that rather than deliberately forgetting, or 
deliberately correcting error, interactions in the solidarity zones need to help us 
to hear the requests and pains of one another, and through developing common 
activities, allow support and consolidation, and the restoration of cooperation 
and harmonious relationships. The oft-found resistance to such ways of memory-
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making means that there is no guarantee of success. In the case of Turkey, due to 
the existence of hardened stances on both sides and few moderates (Watts 
2010; Somer 2008; 2004), the ‘Turco-ethnicized’ history of Anatolia’ (Göksu 
Özdoğan 2010, p. 56), the potent emotional and violent legacy of the immediate 
past, and the lack of moral and global citizenship education, the memory re-
making process is severely frustrated.11 Empathy, healing and forgiveness are 
thus left for future generations to take care of. 
 
Conclusion:  
 
I started my paper by discussing a film in which a Turkish teacher, the harbinger 
of civilization, is called upon to rethink his relationship with his Kurdish students 
and their parents. I used this film as an allegory to highlight how efendi 
Turkishness has reached an impasse and that the hierarchical ordering of ethnic 
identities in Turkey needs to be challenged. The article argued that this process 
itself involves a historical dimension, requiring the dominant identity, namely 
‘Turkishness’, to engage critically both with its past and with modernity, as well 
as with the sphere of ‘Kurdishness’ especially with the official construction of 
Turkish history and the place of 'others' within it. When doing this, the article 
brought studies of Kurdishness and Turkishness into a single conversation and by 
using and synthesizing their insights explored not only the strategies of inclusion 
but also the strategies of exclusion that define Turkish modernity. 
 
The paper, however, resisted a reified and hardened defence of ethnic 
identities as a resolution of the ethno-political problems in Turkey. It instead 
defended a different ‘epistemology of interaction’, arguing in favour of crafting 
solidarities and activities around specific concerns and stances rather than solely 
and exclusively deriving them from pre-existing ethnic identities. As this article 
has put forward, a ‘solidarity zone’ does not mean that one is forbidden from 
acquiring a particular (ethnic or other) identity, or that one has to leave identities 
aside in the hope of building a common authentic voice. It does not demand the 
de-ethnification of the Kurdish question or the flattening of differences. Neither 
does it promote forgetting past injustice, nor the development of a systematic 
neglect, some sort of an ‘amnesic society’ (Misztal 2010, p. 26). It promotes 
remembrances, mediations and solidarities but also remembers the mantra that 
we don’t have to choose between universalistic discourses and ethnic narcissism.  
 
                                               
 
NOTES 
 
1 ‘Kurds’ and ‘Turks’ should not be understood in an essentialist way. For example, some 
Albanians , Arabs, Circassians, Lazs, Kurds who live in Turkey define themselves as ‘Turks’, 
some join the Turkish nationalist parties, some even lead movements and political parties which 
oppose increased cultural and linguistic rights for ethnic minorities in Turkey. This is why 
throughout the article I mostly use the terms ‘Kurdishness’ and ‘Turkishness’. 
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2 The secret state report of 1925, the ‘Eastern Reform Plan’ (Şark İslahat Planı), shows that the 
state acknowledged the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish struggle in confidential documents. See 
Öztürk 2007. 
 
3 Cagaptay notes that whilst allowing the migration of many non-Turkish Muslims from the 
Balkans and Caucuses into Turkey, Turkey prohibited Kurds (another group of non-Turkish 
Muslims) from neighbouring states to migrate into Turkey in order to prevent an increase in 
Kurdish population in Turkey (2006, p. 87). 
 
4 In this period, thousands of Kurdish villages were evacuated (Human Rights Watch 2010). 
Members of Kurdish parties and supporters faced ‘extra-legal threats’ and ‘extra-judicial killings’ 
(Watts 2010, p. 109-110) as well as extensive coercion and torture (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009). More than 
40,000 people died as a result of the violence. See also White 2007 and Gunter 2000. 
 
5 These campaigns began in 1928, and were directed at non-Muslims (e.g. Jews, Greeks) and 
Muslim refugees. However, as Scalbert-Yücel (2010, p. 117) argues, they were also ‘directed at 
other, unacknowledged non-Turkish populations, principally the Kurds’. 
 
6 Launched in 2009, the Kurdish initiative aimed to reduce military presence in the Kurdish 
provinces and to grant (albeit limited) cultural and linguistic rights to Kurds. The word ‘Kurdish’ 
was later dropped, and the title ‘democratic initiative’ was adopted. 
 
7 The ban on the use of the Kurdish language has been relaxed. It can now be taught in a ‘private 
setting’, outside of mainstream education. There is also a state-run television channel that 
broadcasts in Kurdish. However, the teaching of Kurdish in mainstream education is still not 
allowed. Article 42 of the constitution categorically bans the teaching of any language other than 
Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens. Speaking Kurdish in public can still earn a prison 
sentence (in August 2011, the mayor of Bitlis, Selim Sadak, was given a 6 month suspended 
prison sentence for speaking Kurdish in breach of Turkish laws governing political parties 
(Radikal 2011). This was later commuted to a fine of 3 thousand Turkish Liras). In addition, 
taking names which contain the letters ‘q’, w’ and ‘x’ is still not allowed. These letters are in the 
Kurdish alphabet, but not in the Turkish alphabet. Ironically, if a name is Western in origin, for 
example if one takes the Western spouse’s surname, Turkish officials do not resist using these 
letters in the ID cards of Turkish citizens (e.g. Wilkinson). 
 
8 After a surge in violence, the Turkish government, in December 2012, announced the start of 
direct talks with Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK. He is held in solitary 
confinement on Imrali island prison in Turkey.  However, many Kurdish activists question the 
sincerity of the current AKP government. See also Çiçek 2011 on the limitations of the AKP’s 
Kurdish initiatives. 
 
9 It should be added that others, especially non-Muslims, have also been subjects of strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion, facing assimilation and discrimination in Turkey. See Oran 2004 for a 
detailed discussion. 
 
10 The notion of Sevres Syndrome originates from the now defunct Treaty of Sèvres (1921) which 
followed the Ottoman defeat in World War One (the Ottoman version of the Treaty of Versailles 
for Germany). 
 
11 However, there are signs that even though this process is resisted in Turkey, the development of 
an increasingly articulate Kurdish diaspora (from Turkey) in the West will keep alive particular 
collective memories, and also ensure the continuation of Kurdish ‘diasporic battling’ with Turkey 
(Demir 2012). 
 
12 Final version of this article was accepted in February 2013, before the start of Gezi park 
demonstrations. I would like to thank the editors for allowing me to make a last minute addition on 
Gezi protests. 
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